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I. Executive Summary 
 
This review was initiated based upon allegations from multiple sources of possible fraud in the Disaster 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (D-SNAP) administered by the South Carolina Department of 
Social Services (SCDSS), which was implemented in response to the 10/3/2015 statewide flooding from 
Hurricane Joaquin.  Shortly after SCDSS completed processing the 209,927 D-SNAP applications in mid-
December 2015, media reports raised suspicions of fraud.  Upstate media reported the impact of Hurricane 
Joaquin was much less than other parts of the State resulting in only 200 Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) flood aid registrations in Greenville County, yet Greenville County had 12,772 D-SNAP 
disaster applications of which 10,388 (81%) were approved.  Greenville County’s D-SNAP applications 
appeared to be disproportionately 50 times greater than FEMA disaster relief requests.  
 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) approved the D-SNAP federally funded program for residents in 
24 South Carolina counties presidentially declared major disaster areas to provide food relief for low income 
residents.  SCDSS established sites in all 24 counties to receive and approve D-SNAP applications during the 
period of 10/27/2015 – 12/11/2015.  The D-SNAP used two application and approval processes, which were:   
 
 Pre-Existing SNAP Beneficiaries:  SNAP beneficiaries living in the 24 counties used a highly 
streamlined process to either be automatically approved for increased benefits for one month or, in lesser 
impacted counties, required to certify in an affidavit a disaster related adverse event by checking a box 
without explanation of the disaster event (i.e., income loss, property damage, or disaster expenses) or 
dollar amount involved.  Enhanced SNAP benefits averaging $165 were provided to 124,777 households 
totaling $20.7 million. 
 
 All Others – Not Currently Receiving SNAP Benefits:  Eligibility required residing in the 24 counties at 
the time of the event and meeting a dual test:  1) suffered losses from a disaster related event (i.e., 
income loss, property damage, or disaster expenses); and 2) met a monthly adjusted income limit 
(monthly income + cash resources – disaster expenses) during the disaster period (10/3/2015 – 
11/2/2015).  Federal guidelines “eased” verification of application data to reduce the administrative 
burden and reflect the difficulty of applicants accessing records in a time-sensitive crisis environment.  
As a result, only the applicant’s identity required verification, while all other self-reported data (i.e., 
qualifying disaster event, income, and proof of county residence) did not require verification prior to 
approval.  SCDSS received 209,927 D-SNAP applications, of which 179,588 households (86%) were 
approved resulting in an average $425 benefit totaling $76.5 million.   
 
In total, 304,365 South Carolina households received $97.2 million in D-SNAP benefit assistance.    
 
The USDA requires states providing D-SNAP to conduct a post-disaster comprehensive review, to include audit 
testing applications (500 maximum).  SCDSS audited a 5% sample (9,029 applications) of the approved D-
SNAP applications, which was 17 times more than federal guidelines required.  SCDSS identified 1,207 cases 
of overpayment of D-SNAP benefits through a desk audit technique, which used records, telephone interviews, 
database checks, but no fieldwork.  Of these 1,207 cases, 51 cases were classified as agency error due to 
incorrectly computing the benefit amount or misapplying policy; 859 were classified as client error caused by 
an unintentional misunderstanding or inadvertent errors; and 297 were determined to be Intentional Program 
Violation’s (IPV) where the recipient provided false information with a deceitful intent to defraud.  A review of 
the 297 IPV cases depicted 277 (93%) were caused by under-reported income; 7 (2%) were inaccurate 
household size; and 13 duplicate D-SNAP or SNAP payments (5%).  There were no IPV cases caused by 
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II. Background 
 
A. Predicate 
 
This review was initiated by the State Inspector General (SIG) predicated upon allegations from media 
reporting and law enforcement of possible fraud related to the Disaster Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (D-SNAP) administered by the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), which was 
implemented in response to the 10/3/2015 flooding by Hurricane Joaquin.  The SCDSS requested and was 
approved by the United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) to 
implement a D-SNAP in 24 counties presidentially declared a “major disaster.”  Only households residing in the 
24 counties on 10/3/2015 and suffered disaster related damage or disaster losses were potentially eligible for 
income based D-SNAP benefits.   
 
Shortly after SCDSS completed its approval process for 209,927 D-SNAP applications in mid-December 2015, 
media reports raised suspicions of fraud.  Upstate media reported the impact of Hurricane Joaquin was much 
less than other parts of the state resulting in only 200 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) flood 
aid registrations in Greenville County, yet Greenville County had 12,772 D-SNAP disaster applications of 
which 10,388 (81%) were approved (see Appendix J).  Greenville County’s D-SNAP applications appeared to 
be disproportionately 50 times greater than FEMA disaster relief requests.  This disproportionate pattern was 
also evident in Spartanburg County with 7,113 approved applications and 200 FEMA disaster relief requests.   
 
The USDA-FNS requires states providing D-SNAP to conduct a post-disaster comprehensive review, to include 
individual application audit testing (500 maximum).  The SCDSS’s audit tested 5% of D-SNAP applications 
totaling 9,029, which was 17 times the federal requirement.  Given the SCDSS’s tremendous audit efforts, the 
SIG review focused on providing assurance the SCDSS D-SNAP implementation and review/audit followed 
federal guidelines, particularly the fraud preventative controls; understanding the fraud risk through SCDSS’s 
audit of individual cases; and identifying opportunities to further address any residual risk/suspected fraud not 
addressed through the SCDSS application audit.   
B. Scope & Objectives  
This review’s scope and objectives were: 
 Assess SCDSS’s D-SNAP implementation for compliance with federal guidelines, with emphasis on 
fraud preventative controls;   
 
 Assess the SCDSS’s post-disaster review and audit methodology for compliance with federal guidelines, 
with emphasis on understanding the fraud risks and resolution strategies; and 
 
 Identify residual risk/suspected fraud not addressed through the SCDSS review and available 
opportunities to address.     
Reviews by the SIG are conducted in accordance with professional standards set forth by the Association of 
Inspectors General, often referred to as the “Green Book.” 
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C. D-SNAP Overview 
After a major disaster, a state can apply for D-SNAP to the USDA-FNS, which provides temporary food 
assistance for low income households in disaster areas.  The state’s application should include a damage 
assessment describing the geographical boundaries of the affected populated areas (counties and specific zip 
codes); effect upon commercial channels of food; and estimated total households affected.  The USDA-FNS can 
then approve a request, which is followed by assuring a state’s compliance by providing regulations, guidance, 
and monitoring a state’s D-SNAP implementation.  The federal government funds 100% of the benefits and 
approximately 50% of a state’s administrative costs.  A key principal in the federal regulations and guidance 
impacting the fraud risk is application verification rules are “eased” during a disaster.  This is done to reduce 
administrative burdens and reflect the difficulty of households and eligibility workers may not have access to 
usual verification resources.   
 
III. D-SNAP Implementation 
 
Twenty four counties were approved for D-SNAP benefits for low income households.  These counties were:  
Bamberg; Berkeley; Calhoun; Charleston; Clarendon; Colleton; Darlington; Dorchester; Fairfield; Florence; 
Georgetown; Greenville; Greenwood; Horry; Kershaw; Lee; Lexington; Marion; Newberry; Orangeburg; 
Richland; Spartanburg; Sumter; and Williamsburg.   
 
Benefits were distributed through two approval mechanisms.  First, current SNAP beneficiaries received 
benefits through a highly streamlined process.  SNAP beneficiaries in the 10 hardest hit counties automatically 
had their monthly SNAP allotment increased to the maximum benefit based on household size regardless of the 
household’s established SNAP income level.  SNAP beneficiaries in the next 10 hardest hit counties living 
within specifically identified hard hit zip codes also automatically received an increase to the maximum SNAP 
benefit.  The residual SNAP beneficiaries living outside of the identified zip codes in the remaining four 
counties, had to file an Affidavit of Loss to receive an increase to the maximum allotment (see Appendix C).  
This affidavit required the SNAP beneficiary certify by checking a box of either a loss of income; unreimbursed 
disaster related expenses; or inaccessible liquid resources (rarely used).  No explanation of disaster event or 
dollar amount involved were required.     
 
The second benefit distribution method was for all others not currently receiving SNAP benefits, also known as 
D-SNAP beneficiaries.  To be eligible, a household must have resided in the identified disaster area at the time 
of the event, experienced a qualifying disaster event (i.e., income loss, property damage, or disaster expenses) 
and purchased or planned to purchase food during the benefit period.  Households meeting the qualifying 
disaster event criteria were then measured against the D-SNAP disaster adjusted monthly income limits 
(monthly income + cash resources – disaster expenses) in order to determine eligibility.      
 
The D-SNAP implementation strategy emphasized providing potential applicants, as well as SCDSS D-SNAP 
workers, widespread information on fraud awareness and fraud admonishments prior to filing an application as 
a fraud deterrent.  The SCDSS implemented a number of preventative fraud controls prior to accepting 
applications, which included: 
 
 SCDSS notified the general public through a variety of communication channels of the application site 
locations and operating hours; D-SNAP eligibility and verification requirements; fraud control 
measures; civil and criminal penalties for fraud; and the proper use of D-SNAP benefits.  
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 Even though the only application requirement with mandatory verification was proof of identity, SCDSS 
informed the public to be prepared to provide the following:  proof of address; proof of income; proof of 
the value of unreimbursed damages incurred as a direct result of the storm; and proof of loss; or 
inaccessibility of income.   
 
 SCDSS took the following measures to prevent employee fraud and to adhere to implementation 
procedures: used separation of duties for certification and issuance; used special authorization procedures 
for employees applying for disaster benefits; used Benefit Integrity/Recipient Claims Workers to take 
SCDSS employee D-SNAP applications; and conducted a Quality Control review of all employee            
D-SNAP applications.   
 
SCDSS implemented D-SNAP over a six week period from 10/27/2015 to 12/11/2015.  During this six week 
period, SCDSS set up an application site in each of the 24 counties for several days.  This six week period 
ensured SCDSS had adequate staff to accept applications at each county site. 
 
The D-SNAP application and approval process contained six steps: 
 
 Step 1 – Complete D-SNAP Application: Applicants were required to apply in person and complete a 
simple D-SNAP application Form 3456 (see Appendix D).  An applicant’s household must have lived in 
the identified disaster area at the time of the disaster; been adversely affected by the disaster (i.e., 
income loss, property damage, or disaster expenses); and met the D-SNAP income eligibility criteria. 
 
 Step 2 – Interview: SCDSS certification workers conducted an interview with the head of household or a 
responsible household member to verify information presented on the application.  Verifying the identity 
of the applicant was mandatory through documentation or witnesses, while all other data was attempted 
to be verified through records in applicant’s possession, if possible, but not required.  
 
 Step 3 – Verification: After the interview, a separate SCDSS employee reviewed the form to verify the 
form was completed for 1) identity (mandatory verification); 2) residence was in the defined disaster area; 
3) claimed a qualifying disaster loss event; and 4) household composition listed.   
 
 Step 4 – Certification of Income Eligibility:  The SCDSS worker computed the eligibility adjusted 
income (net income between October 3rd and November 2nd + liquid assets - disaster related expenses) to 
determine eligibility.  If eligible, the benefit amount was identified on a chart based on adjusted income 
and household size (see Appendix E).  The maximum allotment for household sizes varied from $194 for 
a one-person household to $1,169 for an eight-person household.  
 
 Step 5 – Screen for Duplicates: The application was taken to “keying” centers around the state and 
entered into a database to identify either duplicate D-SNAP participant entries or applicant was currently 
receiving SNAP benefits.  If either occurred, the application was denied to eliminate a duplicate 
payment of benefits. The denied applications were reviewed on-site by a Quality Control reviewer.  
    
 Step 6 – Benefits Posted to the Household’s Account:  If no duplicate benefit payments were identified, 
the D-SNAP benefit would be electronically placed on the client’s electronic benefits transfer (EBT) 
card provided during the application process.  This one time D-SNAP payment on the EBT card had to 
be used to purchase food.    
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During the six week period, SCDSS received 209,927 D-SNAP applications, of which 179,588 households 
(86%) were approved for $76.5 million in benefits.  An additional $20.7 million in enhanced SNAP benefits 
were disbursed to 124,777 SNAP households.  In total, 304,365 South Carolina households received $97.2 
million in D-SNAP and SNAP benefit assistance related to Hurricane Joaquin.    
 
The approval rates varied among the 24 counties as follows:  2 counties 70% - 79%; 17 counties 80% - 89%; 
and 5 counties 90% - 94%.  The denied D-SNAP applications totaled 29,494 (14%), which were denied based 
on the following reasons:  failed to complete an interview; failed to furnish information; income exceeded the 
limits; household composition; duplicate participation - household already receiving SNAP benefits; or 
voluntary withdrawal.   
 
IV. Post-Disaster Review 
 
The USDA requires the state to conduct a comprehensive post-disaster review.  This review is composed of four 
parts:  overview of the D-SNAP operation implemented; audit a sample of individual cases; conduct an error 
analysis; and identify potential improvements.  The SCDSS post-disaster report was submitted to USDA (see 
Appendix F), which was accepted and confirmed that SCDSS operated a successful D-SNAP (see Appendix H).   
 
The SIG’s review of the D-SNAP operation summarized in the previous section of this report was within 
federal guidelines.  SCDSS’s procedures serving as deterrents to both applicant fraud and employee 
wrongdoing were also within guidelines, to include exceeding requirements in several areas.   
 
The heart of assessing and understanding the fraud risk emanated from SCDSS’s audit of individual cases.  
Existing SNAP beneficiaries receiving increased benefits from D-SNAP (124,777) were not audited inasmuch 
as they were pre-qualified through the SNAP approval process.  Further, many SNAP beneficiaries were not 
required to provide any documentation on a qualifying disaster event, and those required to have a qualifying 
disaster event only certified by checking a box on an affidavit without providing a narrative or dollar loss 
amount. 
 
Only those applications from non-SNAP beneficiaries (209,927) were audited through sample testing of 
applications.  Further, federal guidelines required SCDSS to conduct a 100% audit of all SCDSS employees 
approved for D-SNAP benefits. 
 
A. Audit of D-SNAP Applications 
 
The USDA post-disaster review required a state to conduct a random sample audit of at least 0.5% of new         
D-SNAP applications, up to a maximum of 500 applications.  SCDSS decided to increase its sample size to 5%, 
or 17 times the required sample size.  This equated to a sample of 9,029 applications from the total 179,588 
approved applications in the 24 counties.  SCDSS decided to stratify the population based on fraud risk, such as 
increasing the proportional sample size in the four counties suffering the least disaster damage impact given the 
likelihood of a higher fraud risk.   
 
SCDSS developed a “Phase I” desk audit program checklist, which combined telephone interview questions 
with income verification database checks to determine if the benefit was appropriately approved and accurately 
calculated.  The audit program emphasized collection of financial data and household composition to determine 
if the applicant’s adjusted income qualified for the D-SNAP benefit.  The audit program, which was a desk 
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D. Analysis of D-SNAP Fraud Risk & Mitigation 
 
D-SNAP federal guidelines, which SCDSS followed, required to operate in a crisis inherently created a low 
management control environment and correspondingly created a high risk for fraud.  The fraud risk of D-SNAP 
contained two components:  1) falsification of applicant’s qualifying disaster event (i.e., income loss, property 
damage, or disaster expenses); and 2) inaccurate applicant income data causing an overpayment.  The SCDSS 
properly followed the federal audit guidelines with robust audit testing income data of the sample cases, 
however the federal audit guidelines did not require meaningful audit testing an applicant’s self-reported 
qualifying disaster event.  Given the federal program’s design that any disaster loss, no matter how small, 
triggered a full monthly D-SNAP benefit averaging $425, the lack of audit testing the qualifying event likely 
had an immaterial impact on discovering additional fraud.  The federal guidelines not requiring verification of 
data beyond the applicant’s identity led to weak, if any, narrative of the qualifying disaster event, thus 
applicants self-reported qualifying disaster events were essentially un-auditable.   
 
Even though the falsification of applicant’s qualifying disaster event risk can’t be further mitigated or 
addressed, there is potential to address the inaccurate applicant income data causing an overpayment risk.  This 
risk was estimated at $10.4 million in overpayments in the unaudited 95% of approved D-SNAP applications.  
However, any follow-up consideration has to be measured against likely actual recoveries and the intentionally 
low management control environment applicants were placed in due to the crisis. 
 
V. Way Forward 
 
The SCDSS’s D-SNAP implementation and post-disaster review/audit were compliant with federal guidelines, 
and exceeding guidelines in several areas; SCDSS’s efforts should be commended for operating a successful   
D-SNAP (see Appendix H).  Neither the federal nor state governments should apologize for the necessity of 
using a low management control environment to disburse needed funds to low income citizens for food in the 
aftermath of a crisis.  However, to further mitigate the risk of fraud for future D-SNAP implementation 
planning, the SCDSS should consider the following: 
 
 SCDSS has the latitude to adjust the application process mandatory data (i.e., auditable narrative of 
disaster event) or verification requirements if the post-disaster environment permits.  The federal 
guidelines note each disaster is uniquely different and the availability of verification will likely vary 
depending on the circumstances.  Heightened application justifications and verifications will deter fraud 
if the disaster circumstances and state administrative capacity allows.   
 
 Given the low management control environment for D-SNAP applications during a crisis, it highlights 
the criticality of precisely defining the geographical boundaries of the major disaster.  This is certainly 
challenging during the “fog” immediately after the crisis event, but the justification for the “eased” 
verifications directly correlates with actual crisis conditions.  The State should be fully aware the low  
D-SNAP application management controls should not be relied upon to prevent applicants claiming a 
fraudulent qualifying disaster event in lesser hard hit approved disaster areas.  This may have been the 
case in Greenville and Spartanburg Counties, which clearly had proportionately less disaster damage 
than other disaster declared counties as indicated by FEMA reporting (see Appendix A).        
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Findings & Recommendations 
 
Finding #1:  The SCDSS D-SNAP implementation and post-disaster review/audit were compliant with federal 
guidelines. 
 
Finding #2:  The “streamlined” D-SNAP federal guidelines, particularly the “eased” application verifications, 
required to operate in a crisis inherently created a low management control environment and correspondingly 
created a high risk for fraud.     
 
Recommendation #2a:  The SCDSS should consider for future D-SNAP implementations adjusting the 
application process mandatory data (i.e., auditable narrative of disaster event) or verifications if the post-
disaster environment permits.   
 
Recommendation #2b:  The SCDSS should consider for future D-SNAP implementations the criticality 
of precisely defining the geographical boundaries of the disaster to better justify using the D-SNAP’s 
low management control environment in approving disaster relief, as well as the State should be fully 
aware D-SNAP’s lesser disaster management controls provide nominal protection to prevent applicants 
claiming a fraudulent qualifying disaster event in lesser hard hit areas.     
 
Finding #3:  The federal D-SNAP audit guidelines adequately tested for the risk of inaccurate applicant income 
data causing an overpayment, but the “eased” application verification guidelines created conditions making 
assessing the risk of applicants falsifying a qualifying disaster event un-auditable.   
 
Finding #4:  The 170,559 unaudited approved D-SNAP applications representing $72.2 million in D-SNAP 
benefits paid contain an estimated $10.4 million in overpayments; consideration for additional auditing to 
recover has to be measured against likely actual recoveries and the intentionally low management control 
environment applicants were placed in due to the crisis. 
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